Abstract. In [1] a Niederreiter-type public-key cryptosystem based on subcodes of generalized Reed-Solomon codes is presented. In this paper an algorithm is proposed which is able to recover the private key of the aforementioned system from the public key and which is considerably faster than a brute force attack. It is shown that the example parameters proposed in [1] are insecure.
Introduction
The McEliece [2] and Niederreiter [3] encryption scheme are the most well-known code-based public key cryptosystems. Their security rests on two intractability assumptions: on the one hand it is difficult to decode an arbitrary linear code, on the other hand it is difficult to recover the structure of the underlying code from an arbitrary generator matrix which forms the public key in these systems. Indeed, the general syndrome decoding problem was shown in [4] to be NP-complete. Moreover there is practical evidence, that it is hard for random instances, too. Several quite sophisticated algorithms to attack the decoding problem were published (for example [5, 6] ), but their running times remain exponential.
The hardness of the structural problem crucially depends on the kind of codes being used. The original Niederreiter scheme made use of generalized ReedSolomon (GRS) codes. A polynomial time algorithm reconstrucing the code parameters from an arbitrary generator matrix was found afterwards by Sidelnikov and Shestakov [7] . Therefore the original Niederreiter scheme is completely broken. On the other hand McEliece proposed Goppa codes for his scheme. Up to now no efficient way is known to compute the parameters of these codes from the public key.
In [1] Berger and Loidreau propose a variant of the Niederreiter scheme which is intended to resist the Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack. The idea is to work with a subcode of a GRS code instead of a complete GRS code in order to hide its structure. In this paper we develop an attack on the modified system which is
The Modified Scheme
First of all let's recall some basic facts about generalized Reed-Solomon codes. In the following let F be a finite field.
Definition 1.
Let m, k, n ∈ N, k ≤ n, α = (α 1 , . . . , α n ) ∈ F n , x = (x 1 , . . . , x n )∈ (F \{0}) n , where the α i are pairwise distinct. The generalized Reed-Solomon code (or GRS code) GRS n,k (α, x) is a linear code over F given by the generator matrix
. . x n α n . . . . . .
Consequently GRS n,k (α, x) consists exactly of those words c in F n which can be written c = (
GRS codes allow efficient error correction. Given x and α one can apply the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm which can correct up to n−k 2 errors in polynomial time. (For details see [8, 9] .) In context of cryptography it is always assumed that GRS n,k (α, x) has full length, i.e. n = #F and char F = 2. For a fixed GRS code GRS n,k (α, x) the parameters α and x are not uniquely determined:
Proof. See [9] .
It follows for example that two of the α i can be chosen arbitrarily. Each of the different parameters for a given GRS code is equally suited for the above mentioned decoding algorithm.
Proposition 2. Let α, x be defined as above and u
Proof. See [9] . Proposition 2 will be helpful later for reconstructing x if α is known.
The Berger-Loidreau modification of the Niederreiter public-key scheme works as follows (we present the dual version of the scheme given in [1] , which has the same security, see [10] ):
Key creation: Let n = #F, k ∈ N ≤n and a small l ∈ N ≤k be given. Alice chooses a random GRS code GRS n,k (α, x) with generator matrix G α,x and a random (k − l) × k−matrix A over F of rank k − l. Then her public key is given by T := A · G α,x . The secret key is (α, x). (A must be kept secret, too.)
Encryption: To encrypt a message m ∈ F k−l Bob chooses a (secret) vector e ∈ F n of Hamming weight ≤ n−k 2 and computes the cipertext c := mT + e. Decryption: Using (α, x) Alice applies the decoding algorithm to c getting mT. By multiplying this with a right-side inverse of T she gets m.
The Attack
We fix some additional notation. For a (k × n)−matrix T = (t i,j ) let E(T ) be the echelon form of T and < T > the code generated by T. The i−th row of T is denoted by t i . Given a permutation π : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} let T π denote the matrix (t i,π(j) ), i.e. the columns of T are permuted according to π.
Now let T be the public key of the aforementioned encryption scheme. Clearly T is a generator matrix of a (k − l)−dimensional subcode of GRS n,k (α, x). Our aim is to find the parameters α and x (or equivalent parameters, see Proposition 1) where only T is given. The attack consists of two steps. In the first step (which is the more expensive one) the permutation of the field elements α is calculated. In the second step x is recovered.
Let c ∈< T >. Recall that c can be written in the form
where
. For all i = 1, . . . , n we then have
The main idea of the attack is based on the following
for all j = 1, . . . n with t b,j = 0. 
Proof. For given i, b let t i , t b the respective rows of E(T
for c = i, b and they must have the form
with P i and P b having degree l at most. So for all j = 1, . . . , n with t b,j = 0 we have
Note that P i , P b in the above proposition may have common factors, so these polynomials are not unique in general. Since P i and P b have low degree we can now try to reconstruct the coefficients of both polynomials. If we do so for different rows t i of E(T ) it is possible to recover the α i as we will see below.
First of all we need a simple
Q(x) be a rational function over F with deg P, Q ≤ i ∈ N, P, Q relatively prime and Q monic. Let x 1 , . . . , x 2i+1 ∈ F be pairwise distinct values, for which f is defined. Then the coefficients of P and Q are uniquely determined by the pairs (x j , f(x j )), j = 1, . . . , 2i + 1 and can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. LetP ,Q be another pair of relatively prime polynomials over F with
Since PQ andP Q are polynomials of degree ≤ 2i it follows PQ =P Q. According to our assumptions P and Q have no common divisiors, so we have Q|Q and analogicallyQ|Q.Q and Q are monic, soQ = Q. It follows P = P immediately. This shows the uniqueness of P and Q. 
Obviously this can be done in polynomial time, too. Now consider (2) again. We're fixing an arbitrary b, for example b = k − l =: r, and putP
and
Qi (x) for i = 1, . . . , r − 1. The first step is to reconstruct the coefficients ofP i andQ i . These polynomials have degree ≤ l + 1 so according to the lemma above we need to know 2l + 3 pairs (α j , g i (α j )) to do so. The If there are two distinct polynomials P * i , P * j with degree l + 1 then Q * i =Q i and Q * j =Q j (assuming that these polynomials are monic), and condition C2 can be replaced by
The advantage of C3 is that it is straightforward to check from an algorithmic point of view, while C2 is more complicated (but also can be checked in polynomial time). So we always assume first that there is such a pair P * i , P * j , which is the case with high probability. Condition C1 can be verified easily, too, by the Euclidian algorithm. If the guess was right we can reconstruct the parameter α = (α 1 , . . . , α n ) of the GRS code from the P * (β 1 , . . . , β n ) := (α π(1) , . . . , α π(n) ). The matrix T π is a generator matrix of a subcode of GRS n,k (β, x π ). Since the β i = α i , i = r + 1, . . . r + 2l + 3 are given, the β 1 , . . . β r−1 -and thereby the α i1 , . . . , α ir−1 -can be determined exactly the same way as described above when working with E(T π ) instead of E(T ). This process can be repeated for different suitable permutations until all α i are found.
We summarize the complete procedure in Algorithm 1. It makes use of the function getAlpha which is defined in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 1. Reconstruction of α
2l+1 with βi pairwise distinct do 5:
I ← {1, . . . , r − 1, r, r + 2l + 4, . . . , n} 6:
b ← min(r − 1, #I) 8:
ij ← least element of I 10:
end for 12:
for Once the set of candidates B is given is remains to check for each α ∈ B if there is a x = (x 1 , . . . x n ), s.t. < T >⊂ GRS n,k (α , x). (We know that there is at least one such α .) This can be done using Algorithm 3.
According to Proposition 2 the dual code of GRS n,k (α, x) is also a GRS code G = GRS n,n−k (α, x ). Let g be a row of the canonical generator matrix of G. Since each row vector t of T is an element of GRS n,k (α, x) the inner product t · g is equal to zero. That's why x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) has to be a solution of the linear system for i ← 1, . . . , n do 7: echelon forms E(T π ) for a fixed set of suitable permutations π in advance instead of computing them in each call of getAlpha. In this case we get an upper bound O(r 2 n + n 2l+1 rl 3 ). In Algorithm 3 the main loop is run #B times, and the dominant step in each loop is the linear system. It has n unknowns and (k − 1)r equations so it takes at most O(n 2 kr) operations to find a nontrivial solution. We get a worst case complexity of O(#B · n 2 kr) operations. In general #B is expected to be quite small so that Algorithm 3 is feasible.
In [1] an attack on the cryptosystem is given, which uses the original Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack as a black box algorithm. Its average running time is lower bounded by Ω(n kl ) operations, so for practical choices of n, k, l the attack given here is much faster.
Refinement of the Attack
The above algorithm can be improved if there are two rows in the echelon form E(T ) = (t i,j ) which have more than k − l − 2 zeros in common. Suppose the i-th and the b-th row, i = b, have k − l − 2 + s zeros in common positions. It is 0 ≤ s ≤ l. With the same argument as in proof of Proposition 3 there are two polynomials
for all j = 1, . . . , n with t b,j = 0. So to find these polynomials only 2(l−s+2)−1 = 2(l − s)+3 of the α j have to be known according to Lemma 1, and the number of guesses which have to be made is reduced by a factor O(n 2s ). To check whether the guess is correct we make use of the following
We say that v dominates w, if
Obviously for given v ∈ S n , w ∈ S k it can be checked with O(n) operations if v dominates w.
Let J ⊂ {1, . . . , n} be the set of those j, where t i,j = 0 or t b,j = 0. For γ ∈ F with γ = 0 we define γ 0 =: ∞. Suppose the elements of F are ordered in some way. If the guess of the α j is correct then the vector (
Q * (γ) ) γ∈F has to dominate the vector ( Q * (x) takes the value δ ∈ F ∪ {∞} for exactly one γ ∈ F , f (γ) = δ, and there is a j ∈ J with ti,j t b,j = δ. Then α j = γ. If we can find at least 2s additional α j with t b,j = 0 this way we can try to compute relatively prime polynomials P *
for all j = 1, . . . , n with t b,j = 0. Of course the right polynomials have to comply with conditions C1 and C2 / C3. This allows us to reconstruct the remaining α j as seen above.
If there are not enough δ s.t. f (γ) = δ can be solved uniquely, then at least we can extract a list of candidates for each α j , j ∈ J, which consists of all γ with f (γ) = ti,j t b,j . We can then choose a sufficient number of short candidate lists and try to solve (4) with the different possible assignments for the α j .
What can we do now, if a pair of rows in E(T ) with more than k−l−2 common zeros does not exist? In this case we can try to find such a pair in the echelon form of an equivalent code of < T >⊂ GRS n,k (α, x). Let π : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} be a permutation. Remember that due to the definition of GRS codes the matrix T π is a generator matrix of a subcode of GRS n,k (α π , x π ). So we can replace T by T π for distinct permutations π and look for rows in the echelon form E(T π ) which have more than k − l − 2 common zeros. When such a pair is found we apply the above method which eventually finds a set of candidates for α π , which can easily be transformed to a set of candidates for α. When choosing the permutations we can restrict ourselves to those π which satisfy π(i) > k − l for at least one i ∈ {1, . . . , k − l}, since otherwise E(T π ) differs from E(T ) only by the order of rows.
Note however that such a pair of rows does not necessarily exist in any equivalent code. For example the subcode C can itself be a GRS code of dimension k − l. As such it is a MDS code and any pair of rows in the echelon form can have k − l − 2 common zeros at most. But for random instances there should be a good chance of finding a pair at least for small s.
The improved approach is summarized in Algorithms 4 and 5.
We try to give a rough estimate for the running time of Algorithm 5. 
2s (r 2 n + rl 3 ))) for the complete algorithm, where t 1 is the (undetermined) running time of Algorithm 4. Here we assumed that the condition in line 15 is always passed, which won't be the case in practice. The average running time should be well below the given bound.
Note that there are still several possibilities to improve the presented algorithms but for the sake of clarity we didn't include them here.
Experimental Results
Algorithms 4 and 5 were implemented in JAVA (with some minor modifications) and executed for different instances of the encryption scheme. We always chose s such that l − s = 1. Table 1 shows some example running times on a 2.6 GHz Pentium 4, 512 MB system. In particular we see that f indP emutation performs well for small s. 2 with βi pairwise distinct do 13:
compute relatively prime P 
Conclusion
In [1] the values n = 256, k = 133, l = 4 are given as secure example parameters for the modified Niederreiter encryption scheme. It is claimed that ≈ 2 2000 executions of the Sidelnikov-Shestakov algorithm for a structural break are needed in a brute force approach. However the above results suggest that these choices for the modified Niederreiter encryption scheme are highly insecure. Extrapolating the data above we estimate that an optimized implementation of the above attack can break such a system in a few days or even hours on a PC.
The encryption scheme is not completely broken though. To thwart the attack n and l should be chosen sufficiently large. However this has other drawbacks. A large n leads to large public keys and a large l causes bigger message expansion. It is unclear if the parameters can be chosen in such a way that it has higher efficiency and security than the McEliece cryptosystem.
